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Sterling Devaluation: Its Implications 
for Rhodesia and neighbouring countries
J. F. Handford
Mr. Handford is a Salisbury economist.
DEVALUATION: NOTES ON THE POSITION IN 
RHODESIA AND NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES
JOHN HANDFORD
It is interesting to recall the different circumstances surrounding the 
successive devaluations of the pound sterling. In 1931 the severe unemploy­
ment brought on by the great depression was reason enough for the 30 per 
cent British devaluation. It was hoped that the unemployment centred in 
the export industries but which had spread throughout the economy, would 
be eliminated by boosting exports through devaluation. In the event, this 
hope was not entirely realised and it took the preparation for a world war 
to completely solve the problem in the U.K.
South Africa, initially attempting to maintain the value of her currency 
in the face of the British action, was forced to follow suit fifteen months later. 
The serious outflow of speculative funds on capital account, the pressure on 
agricultural exports and the harmful effects on the gold mining industry made 
this inevitable.
Rhodesia’s devaluation in concert with Britain was virtually automatic. 
The circumstances of the time were summed up by Woodruffe and Thompson 
as follows: “The value of the Gross Output of European agriculture in the 
Colony, which had reached a peak of £3.4 million in 1927, declined steadily 
to £3.0 million in 1930, fell sharply to £2.1 million in 1931, and remained at 
£2.4 million in 1932, and £2.3 million in 1933. Mining also suffered, although 
not to the same degree. The higher price for gold consequent upon the 
devaluation of sterling in September 1931 gave a fillip to production, but 
even the golden flywheel could not counterbalance altogether the very serious 
falls in the output and value of asbestos, coal and chrome. It took eight years 
for the tonnage of coal and chrome to recover to the levels of 1929, and six 
years in the case of asbestos. The total value of all mineral production dipped 
in the years 1931-32, but went up rapidly thereafter, thanks to the increased 
value of gold production” .
The 1949 devaluation which reduced the pound from $4.03 to $2.80 
was a direct outcome of the war. The U.S.A. alone had emerged in 1946 
with an economy stronger that it had been before the war. The dollar was 
undervalued in terms of most other currencies and Britain particularly was 
finding it increasingly difficult to earn dollars to pay for vital imports from 
the dollar area.
1. H. W. Woodruffe and C. H. Thompson. "Economic Development in Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland". Page 14.
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The British devaluation was immediately followed by similar action on 
the part of twenty-three other countries, including the entire Commonwealth. 
South Africa and Rhodesia had little option but to follow Britain’s lead. 
Switzerland was one of the few developed countries that did not devalue 
In Rhodesia devaluation caused prices for our metal and mineral exports 
to rise; the sterling price for gold was increased immediately, because the 
dollar price for gold had remained unchanged. The Rhodesian prices of other 
exports did not increase by the full amount of the devaluation and in 1950 
their average unit value was only 11% higher than in 1949. The average unit 
value of imports rose by 7% between 1949 and 1950. This relatively small 
immediate impact on imports was a result of their composition; in the main 
they consisted of manufactured goods with Britain as the main supplier. 
Because exports rose more in unit value than imports, there was a significantly 
favourable movement in our terms of trade between 1949 and 1950.
The 1967 Devaluation
In 1967 the devaluation of sterling was as much a European as a British 
problem. The ‘Times’ was of the opinion (just prior to devaluation) that 
“. . . the pound is not under any particular pressure in its bilateral relationship 
with the dollar. . . If the pound and the dollar were the only currencies in a 
bilateral system, then the $2.80 parity would not seriously be in question”. 
The same newspaper also took the view that as the two major European 
currencies, the franc and the mark, had followed the 1949 devaluation, the 
European exchange rates were still ultimately related to the immediate post­
war situation. The successive sterling crises of recent years were seen as 
fundamently due to the fact that the continental economies, which were in 
a state of collapse immediately after the war, had now recovered, whilst 
Britain’s economy had lagged behind.
Time magazine summed up Britain’s problem when it wrote, “For 
most of the post-war years Britain’s productivity has failed to keep pace with 
that of its competitors. Among the major industrial nations, Britain since 
1951 has had the slowest rise in productivity, the lowest rate of investment 
in private enterprise and the largest rise in export prices”. The ‘Times’ of 
London went to the heart of the matter when it stated that “ . . . any national 
currency is backed by the productive capacity and cost levels of its national 
economy”.
The unpalatable economic facts of life are being continually brought to 
the attention of the British public. It remains to be seen if the recent devalua­
tion is a strong enough warning to Britain that the world does not owe her 
a living at a standard higher than she is prepared to earn. Again quoting from 
the ‘Times’, “Benefit flows only from devaluations which are accompanied
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by effective anti-inflationary measures and it is essential to prevent a domestic 
consumer boom during the period in which export industries expand as a 
result of devaluation. It is also necessary, of course, to prevent a major increase 
in wages”. The conditions of the recent IMF loan to Britain spelt this out 
in no uncertain terms and in so doing implied a lack of confidence in the 
management of the British economy to do what is required—regardless of 
party political interests. The British devaluation of November 1967 was 
followed by several other countries. Ireland, Israel, Spain and Malawi 
devalued to roughly the same extent as Britain; Hong Kong and Denmark 
devalued less, and New Zealand and Ceylon more. It remains to be seen, of 
course, how much of the percentage advantage gained will be retained when 
trade settles down after all the adjustments, internal and external.
Rhodesia’s Position
In the pre-UDI era when Rhodesia’s reserves were almost entirely in 
the form of sterling balances and Britain was our most important trading 
partner (buying 25 per cent of our exports and supplying 30 per cent of our 
imports), it would have been inconceivable for Rhodesia not to have devalued 
together with Britain. Now, however, two years after UDI, our reserves, 
apart from the funds blocked in London, are no longer in sterling and South 
Africa is overwhelmingly the most important trading partner.
As the dust settles on devaluation some of the effects on Rhodesia—minor 
though most of them are—are becoming clear. For example, 3,000 local 
residents in receipt of British-paid pensions now find that their payments 
have been cut by the full amount of the devaluation. On the other hand, 
persons in Britain receiving Rhodesian pensions have benefited. Air fares 
payable in countries which have devalued have risen by approximately 16.7% 
The effect of this is that a return passage from Rhodesia to Britain will be 
unchanged if paid for in Rhodesia, but will increase if paid in Britain. 
British shipping lines now must pay more for the services they receive in 
countries which have not altered their exchange rate with the dollar.
The small volume of Rhodesia’s imports still originating from Britain 
should be cheaper than before, and Rhodesians visiting countries which have 
devalued should find their money stretching further. Local residents drawing 
from any of the Trustee blocked funds in Salisbury, against income which 
accrues to them in blocked accounts in Britain, will now suffer to the extent 
of the devaluation. Similarly residents of Rhodesia and South Africa who 
hold Rhodesian stocks registered in London have, since UDI, been receiving 
their interest from Salisbury; as this interest is due in sterling the payments 
will now be reduced by 2/10d. in the pound. (The position of Malawi residents 
remains unaltered.)
It is generally thought that when the bill for the money cost of the 
British Government’s action in blocking Rhodesia’s London securities is
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finally presented, it will include a new element; the Rhodesian Government 
is obliged to make up the difference to the Reserve Bank between an agreed 
market valuation of the blocked London securities and their new reduced 
value in Rhodesian currency. This loss must be paid by someone and will need 
to be considered in any Anglo-Rhodesian settlement.
Shortly after devaluation Mr. Wilson claimed that the Rhodesian £ was 
being traded on a limited black-market for between 8/- and 11/-. Mr. 
Wrathall, the Rhodesian Finance Minister, replied that the Rhodesian £ was 
being regularly traded on the basis of $2.80 parity. Within a few days of 
Mr. Wilson’s statement, HMG confirmed to the IMF that the Rhodesian £ 
had not been devalued and retained its same dollar parity. For Rhodesia, 
the effects of not devaluing must inevitably be considered in two aspects— 
the immediate position and the position when a normal trade pattern is once 
again possible, perhaps following a settlement with Britain.
Malawi’s Decision
In all East, Central and Southern Africa, Malawi has been the only 
country to follow the British devaluation. An important consideration in 
reaching the decision was, in the words of an official statement “. . . to ensure 
that bulk of aid receipts maintain their value in terms of the Malawi pound”. 
Additionally, it was hoped this would “. . . preserve and perhaps increase 
the competitive ability of Malawi’s exports”. It is estimated that if Malawi 
had not devalued she would have lost £1.5 million a year in British aid. 
buy as much as possible from Britain.
Malawi’s principal exports consist of tobacco, tea, maize, rice and 
groundnuts. However, other countries in this part of Africa grow these 
products as well, and it is often the case that when one country has a crop 
surplus, neighbouring countries are in a similar position. In being the only 
country in the area to devalue, Malawi stands to gain an advantage over 
her neighbours in times of such simultaneous surplus. Another favourable 
outcome for Malawi is that the invisible earnings, in the form of remittances 
home, of the 250,000 or so Malawians working in South Africa, Rhodesia 
and Mocambique, should rise in value by about 16% in terms of the Malawi 
pound. Since only about 28% of Malawi’s imports come from countries 
which have devalued, the bulk of her imports will now cost more unless the 
present trading pattern is altered. Importers have already been instructed to 
buy as much as possible from Britain. The extent to which Rhodesia’s 
exports to Malawi will be affected is doubtful, but a minor loss must be 
envisaged.
Zambia, having decided not to devalue, is unlikely to be affected much 
either way. The copper companies, however, are at the time of writing waiting
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anxiously for the Zambian government to rule on whether the royalties and 
export tax payments are to be paid in Zambian or British pounds. The 
Copper Export Tax Act provides for tax at the rate of 40% of the amount 
by which the average three-monthly London Metal Exchange price exceeds 
£300 a ton; the Act does not specify whether the pounds are to be Zambian 
or British. Royalties are also calculated on the L.M.E. price which is now 
significantly higher than before devaluation. Imports from Britain should, 
of course, be less expensive and this should help in curbing the inflation 
which has been accelerating in Zambia during the past two years.
South Africa
South Africa’s decision not to alter the dollar value of the rand was 
by no means a foregone conclusion. Many people are of the opinion that 
the inflation problem has already been brought under control by the 
succession of measures taken by the Treasury. They further believe that 
devaluation need not necessarily have upset this. The reasons for not 
devaluing were set down clearly in a statement by Dr. Diederichs on 19th 
November. The principal consideration was undoubtedly the desire to safe­
guard the anti-inflationary measures which have recently started to take 
effect. Also, South Africa has a healthy balance of payments position and 
is not in need of export assistance such as would come from devaluation.
The South African Government has indicated its willingness to provide 
some form of aid for those export industries which may be substantially 
affected by Britain’s devaluation. The cost of this assistance would be far 
less, according to Dr. Diederichs, than the cost to the country of a rand 
devaluation. Today South Africa depends less upon agricultural and gold 
exports than she did in 1931, and the growth strategy of gradually replacing 
the gold mines by secondary industry is in itself a strong argument against 
devaluation so long as the import content of local industrial processes 
remains as high as it is.
Professor J. A. Lombard writing in the South African ‘Financial Gazette’ 
believes that devaluation would “not only inject some temporary life into 
the gold mines but increase the import cost of raw materials and capital 
goods”. About 80% of South Africa’s imports consist of such materials 
entering into the cost structure of industry. Unless there is a further devalua­
tion by Britain, which would probably involve a general round of exchange 
rate adjustments, it is difficult to imagine the Republic devaluing.
A factor which the South Africans must have borne in mind is that 
at some time Britain will join the European Common Market. This will 
force South Africa to find alternative markets for part of her exports 
currently going to Britain. Acceptance of this fact means that any devaluation 
by the Republic would be of temporary benefit at best.
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In the unlikely event, however, of such action by South Africa, could 
Rhodesia elect to do other than follow her lead in the present economic 
circumstances? There are two considerations which dominate government 
economic policy in Rhodesia at the present time. First, employment must be 
maintained at as high a level as possible, and secondly, exports must earn 
sufficient foreign currency to finance essential imports. At the present time 
both employment and the external trade position are giving no cause for 
alarm. Would the position change if South Africa devalued?
In the absence of detailed direction of trade data, one can only guess 
at the changed pattern. It is believed that Rhodesia is currently exporting 
very little to countries which have devalued. It may be the case that about 
a fifth of our present exports are destined for Zambia and Malawi; and of 
the remainder, perhaps fifty per cent find their way to overseas markets via 
ports in Mocambique (with possibly some £2 million worth of goods remaining 
in Mocambique). The other fifty per cent may well go to the Republic split 
evenly between genuine exports and ‘in transit’ trade. A South African 
devaluation might not disturb this pattern, except for the Rhodesian exports 
which are competitive with local South African industries, as for example, 
furniture, footwear and textiles. It must also be remembered that certain 
South African exports compete in world markets with those of Rhodesia, 
particularly pig iron, hides and skins, timber, citrus fruits and sugar. The 
combined effects of these two limitations which would undoubtedly hit our 
exports if we failed to follow a South African devaluation, might be intolerable. 
Much would depend on how successfully Rhodesian mineral exports could 
continue to be marketed.
Salisbury.
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